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In August of 1978 the Marine Corps approved a plan by its Fiscal 
Division to develop a Standard Accounting, Budgeting and Reporting System 
(SABRS). Designed to replace a number of aging, "stovepiped," and 
incompatible financial management systems, SABRS was envisioned to be 
a comprehensive, user-controlled financial management tool, combining ad-
hoc-unit-level report capabilities with real-time transaction processing. 
The timetable for SABRS implementation was no less ambitious than 
its scope. The Automated Data System Development Plan (ADSDP), dated 
31 March 1980, called for full system implementation throughout the Marine 
Corps by October 1, 1982. [Ref. 1] Unfortunately, full implementation did 
not occur until October 1, 1992 -- ten years later! 
Schedule delays are as common to systems development projects today 
as they were throughout the 14-year development of SABRS. The software 
engineering literature is replete with books and articles chronicling the 
challenges associated with developing computer-based systems. What 
appears lacking in this literature, however, are inquiries into past projects, 
either successful or unsuccessful, that allow those individuals intimately 
familiar with a particular project to reflect openly on its development. 
1 
Abdel-Hamid and Madnick argue that failure to learn from past efforts has 
become an enormous obstacle to improving the systems development 
process. (Ref. 2] They feel strongly that project managers should view 
mistakes and setbacks as learning opportunities, rather than sources of 
embarrassment. With this inherent unwillingness to reveal development 
mistakes on the part of project managers and others, it is not surprising that 
previous attempts to derive lessons learned from the SABRS project are 
nonexistent. 
B. OBJEcnvE AND FOCUSING RESFARCH QUESTION 
The objective of this thesis is to chronicle the SABRS development 
process via archival research and personal interviews. A central focus is to 
determine lessons learned about the management of the systems 
development process. 
Specific areas of interest include, but are not limited to, (1) the level of 
management support provided, (2) the use or abuse of systems development 
methodologies, and (3) the level of user involvement in the development 
process. 
2 
C. SCOPE, LIMirATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Scope 
The perspective is from the SABRS project management level; 
thus, interviews, archival research and literature reviews concentrate on 
management issues involving systems development. The presentation of 
data is limited to the SABRS project, although references will be made to the 
concurrently developed Marine Corps Standard Supply System (M3S). 
2. limitations 
The primary limitations encountered in this project were poorly 
kept documentation and difficulties in locating appropriate SABRS 
management personnel. Much of the SABRS documentation was either not 
cataloged or missing altogether, making it difficult to reconstruct 
development decisions and chronology. Similarly, given the lengthy 
development period, it was not easy to locate individuals who were 
knowledgeable in the management of the SABRS project. Despite these 
limitations, the author does not fP' 1 that their absence significantly impacts 
the data contained in this presentation. 
3. Assumptions 
This thesis is intended to be read by anyone curious about the 
systems development process, especially new project managers unfamiliar 
3 
with the difficulties and pitfalls that are likely to occur. Although helpful, 
prior knowledge and experience in systems development is not required. 
D. lliESJS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I briefly introduces SABRS and orients the reader toward the 
goal of this thesis: to derive general lessons learned about the SABRS 
system development process. 
Chapter ll gives background information on the major systems 
development theories that influenced SABRS developers, including the 
waterfall model and the prototyping paradigm. Also listed are a number of 
factors considered to be causes of development delays, cost overruns, and 
unfulfilled requirements. 
Chapter m details the qualitative research methodology employed by 
the author. An explanation of the interview process, including a description 
of the four interviewees, is provided. 
Chapter IV familiarizes the reader with specific details pertaining to the 
origination of the SABRS concept. Additional background material is 
provided concerning previous Marine Corps financial management systems, 
as well as the concurrently developed M3S system. 
Chapter V uses the acquired documentation to reconstruct important 
SABRS development events. The organizational structure supporting the 
4 
project is also provided, along with a description of the three "eras" of 
SABRS development. 
Chapter VI is a narrative presentation of data obtained by the author 
via personal intetviews with four prominent members of the SABRS 
development team. 
Chapter VII derives lessons learned about the SABRS development 
process based on the author's observations and analysis of the data obtained. 
Eight specific lessons are presented and supported with brief discussions. 
Chapter vm summarizes the thesis and offers some specific 
recommendations for further study. 
5 
n. 11fE SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCDON 
To better understand the issues confronting those involved in the 
SABRS development effort, it is necessary to describe pertinent systems 
development methodologies and the problems associated with their use. 
This chapter begins by outlining the major theories that influenced SABRS 
development. After presenting three generic phases common to all systems 
development projects, the chapter closes with a discussion of some major 
factors that cause project delays and cost overruns. 
B. 1HE ClASSIC 'WATERFAlL" MODEL 
I. Overview 
As every student of systems development learns, there is a 
classical approach to building computer-based systems. Sometimes referred 
to as the systems development life-cycle (SDLC), it is better known today as 
the "waterfall" model. The waterfall approach seeks to define specific steps 
(or phases) through which a development must pass in order to successfully 
complete a project. These phases include requirements analysis, systems 
analysis, design, coding, testing, fielding the system and maintenance. In 
theory, these phases are not rigidly sequential and often require some 
6 
overlap. Similarly, the waterfall model allows feedback from later phases, 
giving an opportunity for developers to correct flaws and oversights prior to 
implementation. [Refs. 3, 4] 
Sprague and McNurlin [Ref. 5] detail an excellent list of 
characteristics most often associated with this classical paradigm. They 
include: 
• Hand coding in a third generation language (such as COBOL) 
• A "structured programming'' development methodology 
• An automated project management system 
• A database management system 
• A mix of on-line and batch applications in the same system 
• Development of mostly mainframe applications 
• Programming by professional programmers only 
• Various automated (but not well integrated) software tools 
• A well-defined sign-off process for system delivery 
• User participation mainly in requirements definition and 
installation phases. 
2. Goals 
While a development project attempting to use the waterfall model 
may not exhibit all characteristics, most can be found. A majority of these 
characteristics are necessary because they reflect the model's threefold 
7 
goals: to introduce discipline, improve reliability and reduce errors, and use 
resources more efficiently. [Ref. 5] 
a. Introduce DiscipDne 
The first goal is to introduce discipline into an unstructured 
process. During the 50's and 60's, when programming and systems 
development was in its infancy, virtually all software was custom-made. The 
programmer designed, coded, implemented, operated, and maintained the 
system. As hardware technology advanced in the late 60's and early 70's, 
allowing multiprogramming and multi-user environments, software became 
the focal point of development. The volume of source code required to run 
such a system was increasing rapidly. Users could no longer perform the 
myriad of programming tasks necessary to develop these larger systems; 
thus, dedicated programmers were hired and given the difficult job of 
translating user needs to functional systems. Perhaps the final straw 
emerged in the late 70's with the advent of distributed systems that 
increased program complexity tremendously. Despite this growth in volume 
and complexity, programmers were still designing systems in their heads, 
creating systems that were both poorly documented and impossible to 
maintain. [Ref. 6] 
As project delays, backlogs, and cost overruns became 
commonplace, proponents of the life-cycle approach argued that the only 
8 
way to develop complex systems was to define and fonnalize the 
development process. Detailed documentation throughout each phase was 
also required, adding a further layer of structure to a previously haphazard 
process. 
b. Improve ReUabUity and Reduce Errors 
A further goal of the life-cycle model is to improve product 
reliability and maintainability. To some degree, the waterlall method 
acknowledges that errors due to oversight cannot be eliminated completely. 
Feedback loops hypothetically drawn between each stage allow developers 
to redo system components as soon as mistakes are discovered. These 
mistakes and oversights are uncovered through a system of detailed 
inspections carried out during each development phase. In theory, this 
should allow errors to be corrected at the earliest possible stage. The 
importance of correcting an error early cannot be overstated. As Boehm 
[Ref. 7] noted as far back as 1981, if the cost of correcting an error in the 
requirements phase is $1, the cost increases by a factor of 100 if that same 
error is not caught until the operational phase! 
c. Use Resources More ERiciently 
The final goal of the waterlall model is to foster more 
efficient use of financial and personnel resources. The structured stages of 
development provide a "cookbook" approach that most project managers feel 
9 
comfortable using. Deadlines, personnel policies, and cost control systems 
are established to correspond with each development phase. Ideally, these 
management initiatives result in a more smoothly administered development, 
reducing the possibility of delays and cost overruns. 
Despite its laudable goals, the classic waterfall model has not 
proven to be a panacea for improving systems development. Many problems 
have been encountered by those attempting to apply the model to projects 
in the "real world". 
3. Problems 
a. Too Much Documentation 
Boehm [Ref. 3] notes that a major shortcoming of the 
waterfall model is the importance placed on detailed documentation, 
especially its use as a measure of progress during the early requirements 
analysis and design stages. What was seen by proponents as a means of 
controlling an unstructured process has become an end unto itself. Rather 
than stress the importance of accurately capturing user requirements, 
developers often allow documentation to drive the process. Regardless of 
its level of detail, documentation that fails to address user needs is both 
useless and costly. 
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b. Requirements Ana Not Stated Correctly 
Another criticism oft he life-cycle approach is that users often 
cannot thoroughly state all requirements during the early development 
stages. Pressman [Ref. 6] asserts that the waterfall model has difficulty 
handling the uncertainty found at the beginning of most projects. The 
tendency of the user is to say, "I'll know what I want when I see it." The 
sequential nature of the classic life-cycle cannot accommodate these 
instances. Furthermore, the language of the user community often differs 
significantly from that of the developer. Getting the developer to thoroughly 
understand the detailed needs of the user is a time consuming and often 
impossible task. 
c. Too Mar.y Methodologies 
The search for ways to overcome the communication 
difficulties inherent between users and developers has spawned its own 
industry. Famous names, such as DeMarco and Yourdon, have become 
systems development icons through their works detailing how to navigate 
through specific phases of the life-cycle. [Refs. 8, 9] Known as 
methodologies, these works provide specific step-by-step instructions for 
completing a particular development phase. 
One such methodology is "structured analysis," used during 
the requirements gathering phase of systems development. Unfortunately, 
there are many versions of the structured analysis methodology, each with 
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its own set of symbols and guidelines on how to diagram user requirements. 
Learning one methodology is not sufficient; the chosen analysis method is 
often based on customer demands and/or the personal preference of the 
project manager. When methodologies for follow-on phases (such as the 
numerous versions of "structured systems design") are included in the mix, 
it is apparent that there are too many confusing variations. As will be 
shown later in this thesis, project managers who become intoxicated with 
the benefits promised by each new methodology risk miring their projects 
in an endless attempt to define requirements. 
C. PROTO'IYPING 
1. Ovenriew 
A user may enter the systems development process with a well-
defined set of objectives, but be unable to express the desired input, 
processing or output requirements. In these instances, prototyping may 
provide the best approach. Pressman offers this summary: 
Prototyping is a process that enables the developer to create a model 
of the software that must be built. The model can take on one of three 
forms: (1) a paper prototype or PC-based model that depicts human-
machine interaction in a form that enables the user to understand how 
such interaction will occur, (2) a working prototype that implements 
some subset of the function required of the desired software, or (3) an 
existing program that performs part or all of the function desired but 
has other features that will be improved upon in the new development 
effort. [Ref. 6, p. 27] 
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The prototyping paradigm differs significantly from the waterfall model. 
Although requirements gathering is the first step in both, the next step in 
prototyping is to produce a "quick design." This design concentrates on 
visually representing inputs and outputs requested by the user. From the 
quick design, a prototype is fabricated. The user then evaluates the 
prototype and initiates a process of refinement and iteration. Ideally, these 
steps allow the developer to better understand the needs of the user. Within 
a strict interpretation of the methodology, when the revised prototype is 
accepted, the developer "throws away'' the working model, using what was 
learned about user requirements to design a more robust system. 
Although prototyping appears to remedy the problem of accurately 
defining user needs, its use has revealed a number of disadvantages. 
2. Disadvantages 
Pressman [Ref. 6] and others are critical of specific aspects of the 
prototyping paradigm. First, there is often confusion between the developer 
and the user/customer over the throw-away issue. When the customer sees 
the "tuned" prototype, he/she may feel the product will soon be ready for 
implementation. Unfortunately, the software is of little use because it 
possesses only superficial functionality, focusing instead on visual 
representations. Upon learning that the system must be reconstructed, the 
customer insists that further delays are unacceptable and demands that the 
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prototype be made into a working system. According to Pressman, software 
development management usually gives in. 
A second disadvantage inherent in the prototyping paradigm 
involves compromises the developer might make to quickly construct a 
working model. A programming language or operating system inappropriate 
to the larger project may be used simply because it is familiar and already 
owned. Furthermore, an algorithm may be employed that is either 
inefficient or unusable in a full-scale project in order to demonstrate 
capability. The danger here is that the developer will design the prototype 
with properties unique to the chosen algorithm, programming language, or 
operating system, neglecting all the reasons why they were inappropriate. 
The unsuitable choice is now an integral part of the system. [Refs. 4, 6] 
3. Prototyping and Fourth-Generation Languages 
The use of the prototyping paradigm has received greater attention 
with the continued maturation of fourth-generation languages. Third-
generation languages, such as COBOL, C, and ADA, rely on the programmer 
describing in considerable detail exactly what the program is to accomplish. 
The theory behind fourth-generation languages is that the user/developer 
specifies what is to be accomplished, and the program determines how to 
carry out that task. Ideally, code will be generated automatically by the 
fourth-generation language translator. As of today, however, few products 
offer complete fourth-generation capabilities. The most powerful fourth-
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generation languages, such as spreadsheets and database programs. operate 
in very specific domains. These include FOCUS, Line, NATURAL and others 
[Ref. 4, 10]. 
As fourth-generation languages continue to mature and exhibit 
more robust code-generating capabilities, they will enhance the developer's 
ability to rapidly construct usable prototypes. In fact, this should also 
prevent the developer from having to jettison the working prototype in favor 
of a more powerful third-generation language. As Emery and others [Ref. 
11] advocate, this "adaptive methodology'' essentially relies on the 
" ... evolutionary development of a prototype program that eventually becomes 
the operational system .... " [Ref. 11, p. 15]. Thus, fourth-generation 
languages (also called I-CASE) may allow developers to overcome many of 
the disadvantages that plague the traditional prototyping paradigm. 
D. 1HREE GENERIC PHASES OF SYSTEMS DEVEIDPMENT 
Regardless of the model chosen (there are many others not germane to 
SABRS development), the systems development process contains three 
generic phases [Ref. 6]. These phases include: 
• Definition phase. Includes systems analysis, requirements 
analysis, and software project planning. Attempts to identify what 
needs to be done. 
• Development phase. Includes software design, coding and 
software testing. Attempts to determine how the architecture will 
be designed and translated into a programming language, as well 
as how the system will be tested. 
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• Maintenance phase. Includes error correction, system adaptation, 
and system enhancement. Focuses on a planned program for 
implementing changes to the system. 
E. FACI'ORS CAUSING DElAYS, COST OVERRUNS, AND 
UNFlJLFULED REQUIREMENTS 
1. General 
Despite the use of various development methodologies aimed at 
improving project management, projects continue to suffer delays and cost 
overruns. Reasons for these shortcomings range from improper use of the 
chosen methodology to incompetence on the part of technical and 
management personnel. Unfortunately, the list of causes is broad and 
constantly changing, making it difficult to establish rules that apply to all 
projects. The literature, however, does contain some generally accepted 
factnrs that inhibit the systems development process. This section 
summarizes those factors. 
2. Shortcuts 
Shortcuts taken during the project often result in extensive rework 
later. Under pressure to fulfill unrealistic deadlines, developers may skimp 
on requirements analysis, design, and testing to keep the project on 
schedule. The end product, however, fails to meet customer expectations, 
thus requiring extensive reconstruction. As described previously, such 
16 
rework in the operational phase can be extraordinarily costly and time 
consuming. [Ref.4] 
3. Analysis Paralysis 
In contrast to the shortcut problem is the fear of leaving the 
requirements analysis phase at all. Gause and Weinberg [Ref. 12, p. 277] 
mimic an Oscar Wilde remark by stating, "After two, or five, or even ten 
years, you can dip into the ongoing requirements process and watch them 
take out a comma in the morning and put it back again in the afternoon." 
The same authors point out that, while developers must have the courage to 
end the requirements analysis phase, the proces~ of refining requirements 
continues. Most developers and project managers mired in this "analysis 
paralysis," however, are convinced that if they simply study the problem a 
little longer everything will miraculously fall into place. Unfortunately, such 
dogged determination only results in further delays and cost overruns. 
4. Users Are Not Involved 
Users, the people for whom the system is being developed, are 
often overlooked as having any significant impact on systems development. 
On the coptrary, their involvement is essential throughout the process. After 
all, it is the user who must be satisfied with the product for it to be 
considered a true success [Ref. 12, p.69]. Delays and cost overruns result 
when user feedback is not sought because requirements are seldom 
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translated perfectly into the desired system. As with shortcuts in the 
development process, extensive rework must be performed to correct 
deficiencies. 
5. Unreasonable Demands 
Often, upper management will require precise cost estimates prior 
to fully funding/approving the development effort. This occurrence is 
especially relevant to DOD systems, where extensive functional and 
economic detail is mandated even before systems analysis begins [Ref. 13]. 
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) regularly criticizes DOD systems 
development for an " ... almost total lack of accuracy in cost estimates" [Ref. 
14, p. 7]. Unfortunately, it is unreasonable to expect accurate cost estimates 
before any meaningful, detailed analysis of the system has begun. 
6. System Complexity 
Dr. Emery introduces complexity as another factor obstructing 
efficient systems development. He asserts that an information system is 
often relied upon to coordinate the activities of the organization it serves. 
As such, the complexity of the organization is mirrored in the complexity of 
the information system proposed. As the complexity of the o~nization 
increases, demand for the information system to provide greater 
functionality also increases. At some point, the desired requirements will 
reach or exceed the organization's current systems development capabilities. 
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Nevertheless, development forges on; and it is no surprise that delays and 
cost overruns result. [Ref. 11, pp. 2-3] 
7. Inexperienced Technical and Managerial Personnel 
The Department of Defense is seriously devoid of experienced 
personnel in both the technical and managerial aspects of systems 
development. In fact, this problem permeates all Government agencies. A 
1989 House staff study [Ref. 15] stated a number of reasons why. First, 
salaries for computer specialists range from 23 to 32 percent less than those 
in private industry. Furthermore, experienced senior management salaries 
are 65 percent behind the private sector. Second, meaningful career paths 
are nonexistent in some organizations, particularly within DOD, where the 
culture favors the warrior over the technical specialist. Without established 
career and educational opportunities, the persistent turnover of qualified 
personnel that plagues all federal agencies will continue. 
It is the author's opinion that this inexperience among DOD 
systems development personnel and project managers causes problems from 
the earliest stages of development. For example, when the feasibility of a 
new system is being considered, the primary architects are functional area 
experts, not systems development professionals. 
Consider an organization within DOD that is determining the need 
for a new pay system. The initial development team would consist primarily 
of financial experts. Therefore, those with limited systems development 
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backgrounds are formulating the very cost and schedule estimates upon 
which funding and approval systems are based. This creates enormous 
difficulties later when development functions (systems analysis, design, 
programming, etc.) are outsourced; what appeared logical to the functional 
representatives simply cannot be accomplished by the actual developers. 
Initial assumptions must be reworked. Unfortunately, the original 
milestones and cost estimates are still used to monitor progress. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided necessary background information relating to the 
theory and problems associated with systems development. The classic 
waterfall model and the prototyping model were described and analyzed 
prior to presenting the three generic systems development phases. The 
chapter closed by listing some primary causes of late systems delivery and 
cost overruns. The theories and issues presented were selectively chosen by 
the author to reflect those areas most pertinent to SABRS development. 
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m RF.SFARCH ME'IHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCDON 
In keeping with the qualitative nature of this thesis, the research 
method employed was the historical case study, relying on multiple sources 
of data, including both archival material and personal interviews. This 
chapter describes the collection of SABRS documentation and how 
interviewees were both selected and questioned. 
B. ARCIUVAL DATA COILECDON 
Initial phone conversations revealed that all SABRS related 
documentation was located at the Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
(DFAS), Kansas City, Missouri (formerly the Marine Corps Finance Center, 
Kansas City). Three days were spent in Kansas City reviewing these data. 
Documentation consisted of eight bookshelves filled with binders pertaining 
to SABRS development. Unfortunately, none of these data were cataloged 
and many of the binders did not contain material corresponding to the cover 
title. This obviously made the research effort somewhat frustrating and time 
consuming. Furthermore, no data were found relating to the management 
of the SABRS program, such as Systems Decision Papers and Mission Needs 
Statements. These life-cycle management documents are required of all 
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DOD components to defend various development decisions and justify 
further project funding (Refs. 13, 16]. These data would have proven 
invaluable, thereby allowing the researcher to quickly determine reasons for 
specific development delays. 
No one currently working on the maintenance of the SABRS system 
seemed concerned that the development documentation was unorganized 
and incomplete. Evidently, none of these materials are required for day-to-
day maintenance and operation of SABRS. It can only be assumed that 
missing documents were either: (1) improperly filed, or, (2) lost in transit 
from Quantico, Virginia in March of 1993, when the SABRS program office 
was closed and all documentation was moved to Kansas City. 
Despite these research difficulties, a number of useful documents were 
obtained. The original Concept Statement (Ref. 17], Requirements 
Statement (Ref. 18], Feasibility Study [Ref. 19], and Functional Description 
[Ref. 20] provide a detailed account of the original specifications, economic 
analysis and milestones established at the beginning of the SABRS 
development process. Further documentation relating to general systems 
analysis and design helped verify the use of structured methodologies [Refs. 
21, 22]. None of the documents studied, however, contained any 
information as to why planned milestones were not achieved. 
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C. PERSONAL INTERVIEW DATA COUECDON 
1. Seleetion 
The primary difficulty encountered in selecting appropriate 
interviewees was simply locating persons familiar with broad SABRS 
development issues. The 14 years taken to field SABRS resulted in many 
members of the development team serving only during specific stages of 
development. Turnover of key management decision makers occurred 
frequently, primarily due to normal military and government service 
rotations and promotions. 
Fortunately, three former program managers and the primary 
systems architect were contacted and subsequently interviewed. Each of 
these individuals possessed broad knowledge of the SABRS development 
process. They expressed many strong opinions; their comments 
corresponded on some issues and conflicted on others. In hindsight, the 
interviewees provided an excellent cross-section of viewpoints that included 
functional, managerial, and technical perspectives. 
2. Background 
The first interview was conducted with Mr. George John, GM-15, 
currently the Deputy Director for Accounting at the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service, Kansas City. Mr. John, working in various capacities, 
has been intimately involved in the SABRS project since 1979. Serving first 
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as an accounting functional area representative responsible for writing 
requirements documentation, he later setved as an interim program 
manager, becoming familiar with development methodologies and other 
management issues. In his current capacity, Mr. John has primary 
responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the fielded SABRS system. Mr. 
John spoke candidly about SABRS development, yet appeared to choose his 
words carefully. Furthennore, his executive officer was present during the 
entire inteiView, but did not participate. 
The next inteiViewee was Mr. Ralph Powell, currently an analyst 
working for Computer Data Systems Incorporated. Mr. Powell is retired 
from both the Marine Corps and the Civil SeiVice, with over 35-years 
experience in Marine Corps financial management. He joined the SABRS 
development team part-time in 1981 for the purpose of integrating SABRS 
accounting policies and procedures. By the mid-1980's, Mr. Powell was a 
full-time member of the development team, eventually becoming the 
program manager responsible for operational testing and implementation. 
Mr. Powell was very confident in his assessment and criticisms of the 
development process, most likely because of his first-hand experience 
discovering and correcting errors during implementation. 
Lieutenant Colonel (now Colonel) Jack Larson setved as the 
SABRS program manager from 1982 to 1987 and was the third inteiViewee. 
Colonel Larson graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School's Computer 
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Systems Management curriculum in June of 1982. He is often credited with 
providing the leadership that ultimately revived SABRS development in the 
mid-1980's. The Colonel is knowledgeable and conversant in all areas of 
both Marine Corps financial management and the systems development 
process. The author was previously associated with Colonel Larson, which 
afforded an extremely relaxed and candid discussion of relevant SABRS 
development issues. 
The final inteiView was conducted with retired Lieutenant Colonel 
Alan Craig, now a senior systems developer for Computer Sciences 
Corporation. LtCol. Craig served as the senior systems architect from 1982 
to 1989. His responsibilities consisted of translating system requirements 
into general and detailed systems design, as well as the coordination of all 
programming tasks. LtCol. Craig was the senior technical member of the 
SABRS development team. His inteiView provided an excellent oveiView of 
the technical problems often created by managerial decisions. LtCol. Craig 
was somewhat reserved during the inteiView, although he answered each 
question in extreme detail. 
3. Interview Outline 
For the author to identify common themes and contradictocy 
opinions, it was necessacy to focus each interview around the same set of 
questions. A most useful outline for this purpose was presented by Dr. Lee 
Gremillion during a lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School in August 1993 
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[Ref. 23]. Dr. Gremillion is a Senior Consulting Manager for Price 
Waterhouse, with many years experience focusing on systems planning and 
development. A portion of his lecture was entitled, "What Influences 
Delivery Rate?," referring, of course, to the chronic systems development 
problems discussed in Chapter n. After researching the topic for many 
years, Dr. Gremillion believes that the following four categories substantially 
influence the systems development process: 
• Organizational Environment 
• Project Team 
• Development Environment 
• Application Characteristics 
This outline is further broken down into specific factors affecting each 
category. The entire outline is reproduced (with annotations by this author) 
in Appendix A 
The author used the outline to formulate a sequence of questions 
focusing on specific SABRS development issues. Appendix B lists the 
questions derived for all interviews. 
It is important to note that use of the outline was not meant to test 
the validity of Dr. Gremillion's work; rather, it afforded the author a concise 
yet comprehensive method of inquiry into the SABRS development process. 
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D. DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis was performed in two stages. The first stage consisted 
of scouring the archival material for data pertinent to (1) the genesis of the 
SABRS program, (2) schedules and planned delivery dates, (3) the use of 
systems development methodologies, and (4) organizational structure. 
The second stage involved compiling interview data. Interview notes 
were "coded" by searching for common themes and contradictory viewpoints. 
These results were then combined to derive a number of lessons learned 
about the SABRS system development process. 
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W. GENESIS OF SABRS 
A. PURPOSE 
To fully appreciate the complexity surrounding SABRS system 
development, the reader must be exposed to the system requirements 
considered crucial to the consolidation of Marine Corps financial 
management systems. Therefore, this chapter describes the formulation of 
the SABRS concept, as well as an oveiView of the system and its original 
objectives. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Problenw With Existing Systems 
The Marine Corps, like so many large organizations in the late 
1960's and early 1970's, developed information systems to meet specific 
functional area requirements. In these early years of computer-based 
systems, the mere automation of manual functions improved productivity 
and efficiency within that functional area. If an automated budget system 
was needed, it was designed and implemented; how the system integrated 
with other financial management systems was an afterthought. 
Unfortunately, maintaining these separate "stovepiped" systems required 
costly management attention and specialized technical expertise. These 
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systems were modified and upgraded continuously to meet ever-changing 
legal and fiduciary requirements. Likewise, the inability of these systems to 
efficiently share data produced redundant and often inconsistent 
management of financial reports. 
At the time of SABRS concept formulation in 1978, the Marine 
Corps maintained several "stovepiped" financial management systems. The 
first, referred to as the Priority Management Effort (PRIME) Operations 
Subsystem, supported all major posts and stations. The PRIME system 
accounted for all base operation transactions, including all civilian labor and 
labor distribution as required. The second major system, known as the 
Marine Air/Ground Financial Accounting and Reporting System 
(MAGFARS), supported all Fleet Marine Force units. This system was 
designed on a non-accrual accounting basis and, since there are no civilians 
in operational Marine Corps units, did not account for civilian payroll and 
labor distribution. Additionally, because all Fleet Marine Force units are 
tenants on Marine Corps Bases and Stations, MAGF ARS was not designed 
to perform or account for base support functions. [Ref. 18, pp. 4-5] 
Along with these two distinct accounting systems, the Marine 
Corps maintained a Class I Budget System. Class I systems are developed, 
programmed, coded, and debugged under the direction of Headquarters 
Marine Corps. These programs cannot be modified without specific 
authority from the Commandant of the Marine Corps. [Ref. 24, p. 4] The 
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Class I Budget System, however, was often supplemented by locally 
developed systems to support specific budgetary requirements. Likewise, 
many other locally developed systems were produced to support financial 
reporting and management requirements. With each Marine Corps 
command developing its own internal financial management reporting 
system, the resulting training and maintenance requirements were deemed 
unacceptable. [Ref. 18, p. 5] 
The need for local commands to develop and maintain systems 
specifically tailored to support financial requirements resulted in the Marine 
Corps formally identifying deficiencies in its assortment of financial 
management systems. Deficiencies highlighted [Ref. 18, pp. 11-12] include: 
• Under normal conditions, a daily transaction took 10 days to 
process, become reconciled, and then be recorded in the official 
accounting records. This excessive period of time required that 
memorandum records be maintained to insure proper control of 
funds. 
• The MAGF ARS and PRIME automated update process required an 
average of 8 to 10 hours of processing time to complete a daily 
cycle. 
• If a manac~r wanted to see a report in a different format than 
what was originally programmed, he had to make a special 
request. It usually took several days before the information 
became available in the format desired. This deficiency forced the 
development of a considerable number of site-unique programs 
that extracted the requisite information and then presented the 
data in the desired format. 
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• The systems did not provide timely data at the level required for 
the field functional managers to effectively manage or make 
sound decisions about their funds. For example, a maintenance 
manager could not get the number of labor hours charged to his 
job in time to adjust his workforce to stay within the authorized 
dollar limit. 
• System logic precluded concurrent processing of multiple activity 
accounts, thereby forcing the processing of each ar.count in a 
separate job cycle sequence. 
• Due to extensive system modifications to accommodate new 
and/or changing user requirements, the resources needed to 
maintain multiple systems reached unacceptably high levels. The 
time required to implement modifications to an existing system 
forced financial managers to maintain manual records. 
• The systems produced voluminous hard copy output which was 
(1) costly and (2) difficult to utilize and manage. For example, 
requests for the status of a single general ledger account required 
the production of the entire ledger. 
• The systems did not provide for the capture of asset depreciation 
data, property accounting, production and performance 
measurement, or contract accrual. 
2. Formulation of the SABRS Concept 
In August of 1978, the Marine Corps Chief of Staff approved the 
Concept Statement for a Single Financial Management System [Ref. 17]. Its 
purpose was to authorize the commitment of resources to study the 
feasibility of developing a single financial management system that would 
correct the deficiencies listed above. The Concept Statement marks the first 
official document addressing the need for a newly developed standard 
accounting, budgeting and reporting system, later to be known as SABRS. 
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Before development of a single system could begin, however, both 
a Requirements Statement and a Feasibility Study had to be produced. The 
purpose of the Requirements Statement is to provide a " ... definitive written 
statement of user requirements," as well as a basis for a Feasibility Study of 
alternative approaches to satisfy those requirements [Ref. 18, p. 1). The 
Feasibility Study [Ref. 19, pp. 1-2] identified the following broadly defined 
approaches to satisfying user requirements: 
• Develop a Standard, Accounting, Budgeting and Reporting 
System. 
• Expand existing Operations Subsystem (PRIME). 
• Expand existing MAGF ARS System. 
• Expand existing Allotment Accounting System. 
• Retain existing system status quo. 
• Utilize existing Financial Systems of other DOD agencies. 
• Devise a manual system. 
The remainder of the Feasibility Study details reasons why the first 
alternative, SABRS, was the selected approach and why the other 
alternatives were not suitable to meeting user requirements. 
C. SABRS OBJECilVFS 
In addition to recommending that the old systems be replaced, the 
Feasibility Study established the following definitive SABRS objectives: 
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• Provide the commander, and the subordinate managers, inquiry 
capability with a maximum of i 5 seconds response time. 
• Insure that the status of funds will be current as of the last 
transaction processed at the local level. 
• Insure that all financial data, other than fund status, will be no 
more than 24-hours old. 
• Provide managers with ad hoc reports. 
• Reduce training requirements by 20 percent. 
• Reduce input errors by at least 50 percent and correctional 
processing time by 80 percent. 
• Reduce memorandum records by 80 percent. 
• Reduce implementation time of directed changes to 30 days. 
• Reduce hard copy computer input/output by 70 percent. 
• Meet all directed systems standards (i.e., GAO, DOD, HQMC, 
Privacy Act, etc.). 
• Make the system capable of direct input/output with other related 
systems such as the concurrently developed Marine Corps 
Standard Supply System (M3S). 
Despite such emphasis on measurable objectives (i.e., provide a 
15-second inquiry response time), the Feasibility Study failed to discuss how 
these figures and baselines were determined. 
Similarly, these objectives relied almost exclusively on the 
concurrent development of both the Marine Corps Data Network (MCDN) 
and the Marine Corps Standard Supply System (M3S) [Ref. 25, p. 1], yet the 
details of how this was to be accomplished were not included in the analysis. 
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MCDN was a program scheduled for implementation in 1982 that was to 
provide the upgraded base telephone lines, connecting trunk lines, front-end 
processors, and other equipment and software necessary to support SABRS' 
telecommunications needs. [Ref. 22, pp. 7-8] 
The Marine Corps Standard Supply System (M3S) program was 
a corresponding attempt by the supply community to integrate their myriad 
old systems into a single system. Because every supply transaction normally 
involves a corresponding fiscal transaction, it was decided that both SABRS 
and M3S should be designed around a common database and database 
management system [Ref. 25, p. 2]. It is somewhat surprising that the 
important details of this integration were not included in the process that 
was intended to evaluate alternative courses of action. 
D. CONCEPT OVERVIEW 
The SABRS distributed network concept was based on the expected 
telecommunications capability of the Marine Corps Data Network. Six 
Regional Automated Service Centers (RASC), located at major installations 
throughout the Marine Corps, were to provide necessary mainframe 
computer processing power. Computer terminals were to be located 
throughout each command, utilizing 4800 bit-per-second modems 
communicating with the mainframe over the Marine Corps Data Network. 
[Ref. 19, pp. 9-31] 
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A common database was to be located within each mainframe 
computer. Data elements were to be shared with the Marine Corps 
Standard Supply System; thus, meetings with M3S personnel were planned 
throughout the development process [Ref. 19, p. 39). The common database 
concept was essential in order for SABRS to allow the one-time capture of 
supply transactions. Under the old systems, supply clerks entered 
requisitions into the supply system and then forwarded a paper copy of that 
transaction to the fiscal office. A fiscal clerk then entered the transaction 
into the accounting system. Errors were common and reconciliation of 
those errors was extremely time consuming. Under SABRS, such 
transactions would be entered only once, and the resulting data were then 
shared between the systems, lessening both the time required for processing 
and the number of errors. 
In short, SABRS was envisioned to be a distributed network of 
mainframe computers, maintaining a common database that would allow 
multiple users to simultaneously input (via modem) transactions directly into 
the system. Furthermore, the financial manager would have the capability 
of accessing his or her current status of funds almost immediately, and in 
the format desired. 
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E. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the circumstances 
surrounding the Marine Corps' decision to initiate SABRS development. 
Also presented were SABRS objectives and a brief concept overview, 
allowing the reader to more fully appreciate the system complexity and 
expectations established by members of the Concept Exploration and 
Feasibility Study teams. The following chapter on SABRS chronology 
includes a presentation of the organizational structure responsible for 
instituting these goals and requirements. 
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V. SABRS DEVELOPMENr CHRONOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCDON 
Detennining an accurate timeline of significant SABRS development 
events was a difficult chore. As mentioned previously, specific development 
decision papers were not located. However, a thorough examination of 
development documents, in conjunction with interview remarks, revealed a 
reasonable break-out of important events. This chapter chronicles those 
events by first presenting the original milestones established in the 
documentation. With these objectives firmly catalogued, the project is then 
divided into the actual "eras" of development derived from interview results. 
Throughout the chapter, the organizational structure supporting SABRS 
development is described, where appropriate, to accent the role this 
structure played in formulating SABRS milestones and managing its 
development. 
B. SOURCE DOCUMENT MD.FSTONES AND ORGANIZATION 
I. Concept Statement Milestones 
The Concept Statement approved in 1978 established the following 
four key development milestones: (1) Automated Data Systems 
Development Plan (ADSDP) approval by 15 March !979, (2) analysis and 
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design approval by 30 August 1979, (3) detailed systems design approval by 
30 September 1979, and (4) full system implementation by 1 October 1980. 
[Ref. 17, pp. 3-4] 
To support this bold schedule, the Concept Statement envisioned 
all design and programming to be accomplished with " ... in-house assets" 
[Ref. 17, p. 5]. These assets were to consist of full-time personnel from both 
the Fiscal Accounting Division and the Command, Control, Communications 
and Computers (C4) Division at Headquarters Marine Corps. Other 
functional assets, such as budget analysts and logisticians, were to be 
assigned on a part-time basis. No specifics were stated concerning desired 
personnel qualifications or the number of people required to complete each 
milestone. 
2. Requirements Statement 
Although not referred to in the Concept Statement, the 
Requirements Statement was the next chronologically published document, 
dated 30 November 1979. The Requirements Statement Work Group that 
developed this document consisted of the Chairman, eleven representatives 
from the Fiscal Division, and four representatives from the C4 Division. 
Their role was to determine, validate, and publish user requirements based 
on input received via the formal staffing of proposed requirements to each 
field activity. The Requirements Statement was intended to provide the 
Feasibility Study Team a basis from which to evaluate systems development 
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alternatives. Furthennore, the document states that the Feasibility Study 
Team began work on 1 January 1979. This creates a certain degree of 
confusion because that date was eleven months prior to publication of the 
Requirements Statement, upon which the Feasibility Study presumably 
depended. Furthennore, there is no formal indication that these two 
documents were intended to be developed concurrently. Note also that the 
due dates established in the Concept Statement have not been met. Both 
analysis and design and detailed systems design should have been 
completed by November of 1979. [Ref. 18, pp. 1-17] 
3. Feasibility Study 
Following on the heels of the Requirements Statement was 
publication of the aforementioned Feasibility Study, dated 27 December 
1979. The Feasibility Study Team responsible for this document consisted 
of the same personnel involved in developing the Requirements Statement. 
In addition to evaluating development alternatives, the Feasibility Study 
Team established the SABRS Automated Data Systems Development Plan 
Work Group. This new Work Group would consist of 22 full-time and 11 
part-time members, mostly from the Fiscal Division. The Feasibility Study 
document itself acknowledged for the first time that contractor support 
would most likely be necessary to augment in-house personnel for both the 
systems analysis and programming portions of development. [Ref. 19, pp. 1-
38] 
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Note once again that no Concept Statement milestones have been 
achieved. Furthennore, neither this document nor the Requirements 
Statement provided any explanation for the delay in accomplishing planned 
tasks. 
4. Top Management Roles and Responsibilities 
The Feasibility Study is the first document that identifies the top 
managers responsible for overseeing SABRS development. Unfortunately, 
their titles are introduced, but not defined. To locate a description of these 
responsible positions one must fotward to the General Design Document 
dated September 1986! [Ref. 21] 
The highest level of management alluded to in the Feasibility 
Study was the SABRS Steering Committee. This committee was composed 
of the Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps, the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Installation and Logistics (I&L), and the Director of C4 Systems Division. 
Established to ensure the proper development of SABRS, the committee's 
responsibilities included: (1) reviewing status and progress, (2) approving 
courses of action, (3) resolving conflicts, and ( 4) providing guidance and 
direction to the Project Management Office (discussed later) [Ref. 21, p. 16]. 
Concurrent with his role on the Steering Committee, the Fiscal 
Director of the Marine Corps seiVed as the Functional Manager, establishing 
appropriate SABRS requirements and objectives. His responsibilities 
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included the overall management of SABRS under the cognizance of the 
Steering Committee. [Ref. 21, p. 16] 
The System Sponsor was the final top management position. The 
Accounting Office within the Fiscal Division held this position throughout 
SABRS development. The System Sponsor's role was to further establish 
requirements and objectives, while managing the SABRS project with 
appropriate guidance from the Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps. [Ref. 21, 
p. 16] 
The role these top management positions played in the 
development of SABRS, especially that of the Steering Committee and Fiscal 
Director, will be discussed in the following chapter. 
5. Automated Data System Development Plan (ADSDP) 
According to its purpose statement, the ADSDP was to " ... provide 
decision makers with a basis for deciding whether to approve for 
development and implementation a standard financial management 
system .... " [Ref. 1, p. 1]. This document repeats much of the information 
presented in the Requirements Statement and Feasibility Study documents. 
Also introduced was a plan to break development into four major phases, 
closely resembling the three generic phases of systems development 
described in Chapter n. These phases were: (1) Analysis and Design, (2) 
Development, (3) Implementation, and (4) Evaluation and Maintenance. 
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The ADSDP then presented revised development milestones, 
based on the four phases listed above. Whereas the Concept Statement had 
planned for complete implementation in less than two years, the ADSDP 
now expected fielding to be completed by October 1982. [Ref. 1, pp. 9-12] 
The ADSDP itself was released on 31 March 1980, a full year 
behind the original Concept Statement schedule. More importantly, 
however, before "official" development of SABRS could begin, the ADSDP 
had to be approved by the Steering Committee. Such approval did not occur 
until 19 May 1981, over one year later. No reasons were given for this 
delay. 
6. Analysis and Design Action Plan 
Because so many documents were missing, chronicling SABRS 
development after March 1980 becomes even more challenging. For 
example, the author obtained the Analysis and Design Action Plan (Revised), 
dated 11 September 1981. A later document, however, referred to the 
original Analysis and Design Action Plan, dated 05 November 1980 [Ref. 21, 
p. B-2]. The author was unable to locate this document. Revised 
documentation would have proven more useful had the incorporated 
changes been annotated. 
Fortunately, the revised Analysis and Design Action Plan did 
provide the first reference to an official SABRS. Development Team. 
Apparently, sometime between approval of the ADSDP and this revision, a 
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project manager was assigned, as well as a whole host of functional area 
representatives. The project manager was the same individual assigned as 
Chairman of the Requirements Statement Work Group, Feasibility Study 
Team, and ADSDP Work Group. Also introduced for the first time was a list 
of 19 contractor billets, including five systems analysts, 12 programmers, 
one documentation specialist, and one data entry clerk (Ref. 22, p. 31]. 
Once again, no evidence was obtained describing how members were 
selected, their qualifications, or how the number of personnel required was 
determined. 
Also included in the 11 September 1981 document was a specific 
reference to the use of data flow diagrams and structure charts. According 
to the Plan, these structured analysis and design techniques were to be 
required throughout SABRS development. No guidance was issued 
explaining how these techniques were to be used, although reference was 
made to the Yourdon and Constantine book entitled Structured Design, 
Yourdon, Inc., 1975 [Ref. 22, p. 15]. This was the first formal reference 
indicating the required use of a particular systems development 
methodology. 
C. 1HREE ERAS OF SABRS DEVELOPMENT 
The above chronology and its supporting documentation only 
introduces the first three years of SABRS development. As mentioned 
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previously, later publications setved only to confuse the research€·r by 
referencin~ superseded documents. However, a clearer picture of how 
SABRS dl'. ~lopment evolved was acquired through the interview process. 
All interviewees agreed that SABRS development transpired over the course 
of three distinct time periods. 
1. The "Floundering'' Era: 1978-1983 
Mr. George John, throughout his interview, referred to the early 
stages of SABRS development as the "floundering'' era. The other 
respondents concurred, and characterized this era as suffering from (1) a 
disinterested Project Manager, (2) lack of methodology training and 
enforcement, (3) analysis paralysis, and (4) improper user/functional area 
involvement. The following chapter presents the interviewee's comments 
regarding these issues. 
2. The Era of Redirection and Progress: 1983-1987 
After five years of wasted effort, the Steering Committee, in 
conjunction with the Functional Manager and System Sponsor, decided to 
completely restructure the development effort. A Project Management 
Office was established, and the entire development team was moved from 
its previous Fiscal Division office, located in Washington, D.C., to its new 
site in Quantico, Virginia. Perhaps more importantly, the Program 
Management Office, while answering to the same top management 
44 
structure, was now fully supported by the Marine Corps' Central Design and 
Programming Activity (CDPA). The Marine Corps' systems development 
expertise resided within this activity. Despite this important qualification, 
the CDPAwas only partially involved during the "floundering'' era, assigning 
a few programmers and analysts to the project. [Refs. 26, 29] 
Concurrent with this major organizational move, the project 
manager was replaced. The new project manager, Col. Larson, is credited 
by the other interviewees with reviving SABRS development. As will be 
revealed in the next chapter, his strong leadership, bold enforcement of a 
standard development methodology, and willingness to incorporate 
prototyping produced this tum-around. 
3. The Testing and Implementation Era: 1988-1992 
The final era involved the ultimate implementation of the SABRS 
system. The four years required for testing and implementation suggest that 
many difficulties arose during the fielding of SABRS. For purposes of this 
study, however, the author chose not to concentrate on this portion of 
dE-Velopment. Although problems encountered during this era may reveal 
useful insight into earlier development, the scope of such a study would 
exceed the author's original goals and objectives. The reader need only 
understand the chronology of this area relative to the other two. 
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D. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided data concerning the chronology of SABRS 
development. Early documentation presents the researcher with information 
regarding planned milestones, organizational structure, and other SABRS 
development goals. These documents, however, do not disclose the 
difficulties encountered during the development process. The researcher 
can only infer that problems occurred in light of the obvious delays that 
transpired throughout the process. Fortunately, the data acquired from 
personal interviews does provide the information necessary to more 
completely analyze SABRS development. The following chapter presents 
these interview data using the outline introduced in Chapter m. 
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VL SABRS INTERVIEW DATA 
A. PURPOSE 
Consistent with the interview questions posed to each respondent, this 
chapter provides interview results using the outline described in Chapter m. 
B. REFERENCES 
All comments and opinions contained in this chapter were obtained 
during the author's interviews [Refs. 26-29]. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENI' 
1. Top Management Support 
a. Steering Committee 
Top management personnel responsible for project oversight 
and funding approval strongly supported the SABRS development effort. 
One reason for this support, however, reveals an interesting caveat. 
Although not mentioned in SABRS documentation, the interviewees stated 
that the SABRS Steering Committee was in reality a joint SABRS and M3S 
Steering Committee. Because M3S had been in development slightly longer 
than SABRS and held more command interest (a supply system is 
considered an "operational" necessity to battlefield generals, whereas a 
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financial management system is considered a necessary evil), M3S was 
considered the priority system. The support SABRS did receive, therefore, 
resulted from (1) its planned integration with M3S, and (2) the fact that the 
SABRS Functional Manager was also a member of the Steering Committee. 
LtCol. Craig further noted that both the SABRS development 
team and the M3S team briefed the Steering Committee three times per 
year. During these briefings, the M3S presentation required so much time 
that the SABRS briefing was routinely cut short. In fact, so focused was the 
Steering Committee on M3S development that once M3S development was 
cancelled circa 1988, the Steering Committee no longer convened. The 
SABRS project might have met the same fate had it not been for the 
personal involvement of the Functional Manager, Mr. Tom Comstock. 
b. SABRS Functional Manager 
In his dual role as Functional Manager and Steering 
Committee member, Mr. Comstock was able to stress to other Committee 
members the urgent need for a standard financial management system. All 
inteJViewees were of the opinion that having such a strong proponent at the 
highest level, who understood the strategic necessity of providing an 
integrated financial management capability to the field, allowed the project 
to proceed despite its many schedule delays. Mr. Comstock was such a 
proponent of SABRS that he took the time during the testing and 
implementation stages to personally visit each installation site. Both Mr. 
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Powell and LtCol. Craig felt that it was unusual for a member of the Senior 
Executive SeiVice to display such an interest in the development of a 
financial management system. However, despite Mr. Comstock's personal 
interest and commitment to the SABRS project, he was strictly a financial 
management expert and, therefore, unable to provide guidance to his 
subordinates concerning systems development matters. 
c. C4 Project Oflicer 
The top management representative tasked with providing 
systems development guidance and review was the Command, Control, 
Communications, and Computers (C4) project officer. This officer was 
assigned by the Steering Committee's C4 representative, and both attended 
all of the tri-annual SABRS briefings. 
LtCol. Craig was very critical of the role assigned this 
individual. As the principal systems architect during the redirection and 
progress era, LtCol. Craig did not feel that proper reviews of his team's work 
were performed by the C4 project officer. He felt strongly that such reviews 
of systems analysis, general and detailed design, and coding would have 
greatly benefited this project. LtCol. Craig further stated that " ... nobody 
from C4 checked on the design, nor were any external reviews performed." 
Rathert han criticize the individuals assigned, however, LtCol. 
Craig criticized the C4 project officer selection criteria. He pointedly noted 
that the C4 project officer was rotated frequently and always filled by newly 
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graduated Captains from the Computer Systems Management curriculum at 
the Naval Postgraduate School. Although he complimented the broad 
education received, LtCol. Craig was quick to argue that these young officers 
lacked the practical experience required to oversee the detailed technical 
review of large systems development programs. LtCol. Craig needed 
someone qualified to perform these technical reviews with both financial 
management and systems development experience, not further layers of 
management oversight. Unfortunately, the officers assigned were never 
financial management or data systems specialists and, furthermore, did not 
possess any knowledge of software verification or validation procedures. As 
a result, external reviews of completed analysis, design and coding was 
simply never done. In fact, the C4 project officer interacted with the 
systems development team only during the tri-annual Steering Committee 
briefings. 
d. Program Management 
Although the support of top management was viewed as 
crucial by all interviewees, the person deemed most responsible for the 
success and/or failure of each SABRS development stage was the program 
manager. The original SABRS program manager, who was also the 
chairman of the preliminary study teams outlined in the previous chapter, 
held this position throughout the "floundering" era. He was, perhaps, the 
most experienced civilian manager associated with Marine Corps 
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accounting. Unfortunately, according to Col. Larson, SABRS program 
management was simply " ... not his thing." He possessed neither the patience 
nor a strong desire to learn the systems development process. Throughout 
his five-year tenure, the project produced a great deal of documentation, but 
showed no meaningful progress. 
During the transition from the "floundering'' era to the era of 
redirection and progress, the original program manager was reassigned and 
Col. Larson was given SABRS responsibility. Col. Larson set a new 
direction for SABRS development through his determined leadership style. 
The other interviewees characterized him as a dynamic leader who 
combined functional area expertise with a broad knowledge of the systems 
development process. He did not, however, rule by fiat. He trusted his 
technical expert, LtCol. Craig, allowing him to make major decisions 
involving the systems architecture without repeatedly returning to re-do 
each supporting functional requirements definition. Col. Larson himself 
pointed to this specific delegation of authority, noting the importance of 
allowing a technical leader to emerge who is capable of making day-to-day 
design decisions. Moreover, he felt that the technical leader must rise from 
within the organization, rather than from contractor support personnel. This 
provides the program manager a level of confidence that technical decisions 
are filtered through someone who fully understands the organization for 
which the system is being developed. 
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2. User/Systems Development Team Relationship 
The process of getting users involved in the early development was 
considered crucial by the three program managers interviewed. Not only 
was it important for purposes of accurately defining requirements, it was 
also necessacy to ensure future success during the transition period from the 
old, comfortable system to the new, unseasoned system. 
When asked how users were incorporated into SABRS 
development, Mr. John responded by explaining the process used during the 
"floundering" era. Periodic field visits were made to each financial 
management activity by members of the SABRS development team. Prior 
to these site visits, advance copies of proposed requirements were mailed to 
each activity. Upon receipt of these requirements, field comptrollers and 
accounting officers were to review the proposed requirements and prepare 
comments for the visiting development team representatives. According to 
Mr. John, the site visits primarily involved the representative comptroller(s) 
and the accounting officer. Therefore, Mr. John believed that only the 
information users of the current financial system took part in the field visits. 
Actual system users --those who entered data, programmed locally required 
reports, and operated the current systems - did not participate in the 
review. 
Mr. Powell witnessed the problems caused by this lack of user 
involvement throughout the testing and implementation phase. He 
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repeatedly encountered personnel who maintained little or no vested interest 
in successfully implementing SABRS. Col. Larson validated this difficulty. 
While serving as the Comptroller of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, 
subsequent to his tenure as the SABRS program manager, Col. Larson was 
charged with overseeing the final implementation of SABRS throughout his 
command. On one occasion, Col. Larson attempted to verify a list of system 
errors attributed to the new system. Col. Larson described the individual 
who submitted this list as a veteran user of the old MAGF ARS accounting 
system, who was constantly complaining about having to learn SABRS. Of 
all the errors chronicled by this individual, over 90 percent were not 
connected in any way to the performance of SABRS, yet it was determined 
that to produce such errors, the individual would have had to enter 
meaningless data or otherwise sabotage the new system. 
Col. Larson used this example to stress the importance of getting 
as many users as possible involved in the earliest stages of development. 
Without this involvement, many individuals become fearful of the coming 
change, unwilling to support a system developed by "those in Washington." 
Even as early as 1983, Col. Larson experienced resistance from alienated 
users who had already determined that SABRS was destined for failure. 
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D. PROJECI' TFAM 
1. Functional Area Qualifications 
Each interviewee characterized the "floundering'' era as one that 
suffered from the absence of qualified functional area personnel. Reasons 
for this deficiency can be divided into two major causes: restructuring of 
the financial management officer community during the early 1980's, and (2) 
the unwillingness of field units to give up their best technical people. 
a. Restructuring of the Fmancial Management ORicer 
Community 
Mr. John expressed concern that throughout the early 
analysis and design of SABRS, the Marine Corps was in the process of 
losing a great deal of its active duty accounting and budgeting expertise. 
The majority of these seasoned Marines were either Limited Duty Officers 
(LDO's) or Warrant Officers. A commission or appointment to one of these 
ranks required that the individual possess considerable experience as an 
enlisted member. It also signified that this individual had consistently 
maintained outstanding performance within his or her specialty field. A 
comprehensive and competitive selection process was used to ensure that 
only the most qualified individuals were selected to fill the limited number 
of billets allowed by Congress. During the late 1970's, the Marine Corps 
financial management community consisted predominately of these 
"restricted line" specialists. 
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However, during the early 1980's, the Marine Corps began 
allowing newly commissioned "unrestricted line" Second Lieutenants to 
choose financial management as their primary Military Occupational 
Specialty (MOS). The rationale behind this program, from the Manpower 
perspective, was that such opportunities for young officers would create a 
pool of qualified financial managers who could, later in their careers, setve 
as senior comptrollers and disbursing officers. Unfortunately for such 
projects such as SABRS, both LDO's and Warrant Officers were forced to 
leave active duty to make room for this new crop of officers. As one might 
expect, billets on the SABRS development team were often filled with these 
less experienced unrestricted line officers. Mr. John felt that SABRS 
suffered because it was impossible to replace 15 or 20 years of functional 
area experience with officers who possessed less than five. 
b. Unwillingness to Give Up Technical Experts 
Despite the restructuring of the financial management 
community, experienced LDO's and Warrant Officers were not totally 
purged. They occupied numerous technical billets, especially in the 
Accounting Offices of major Marine Corps installations. Unfortunately, as 
Mr. Powell adamantly noted, field units were unwilling to release these 
valuable individuals to setve on the SABRS development team. 
Furthermore, the "floundering'' era project manager failed to raise this issue 
with either Mr. Comstock or the Steering Committee. According to Mr. 
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Powell, such attention by these senior leaders could have forced the transfer 
of a number of key officers to the SABRS project. 
Col. Larson, on the other hand, raised this issue during his 
tenure. Although a few experienced officers did join the team, the MOS 
restructuring resulted in a limited number of remaining billets for field 
LDOs and Warrant Officers. Because SABRS was still in development, the 
old MAGF ARS and PRIME accounting systems remained in use. Those 
restricted line officers left on active duty were the only officers with the 
requisite expertise to operate these old systems effectively. So, during the 
first decade of SABRS development, the Marine Corps had created a 
situation whereby it could not risk crippling its current accounting process 
in the hopes of developing an already questionable system. 
2. Internal Organization 
Except for the Concept Statement's initial assumption that all 
systems development would be perfonned in-house, SABRS development 
required three groups of professionals: military personnel, civil service 
employees, and contractor representatives. It was determined early on that 
the technical expertise necessary to completely define, analyze, design, and 
program SABRS could not be perfonned with the available personnel. 
Having witnessed the consequences of mistakes made during the 
"floundering" era, LtCol. Craig was quite outspoken when asked to evaluate 
the internal organization of the SABRS development team. 
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Most disturbing to LtCol. Craig was the exclusion of Central 
Design and Programming Activity (CDPA) involvement during the 
"floundering" era. Although required during the original Concept Statement, 
CDPA sponsorship and support was never sought by the original program 
manager. In the words of LtCol. Craig, Fiscal Division "went on their own 
with the development of SABRS, without any CDPA assistance." 
The original program manager did seek assistance, however, from 
a systems development contractor. The major criticism by LtCol. Craig of 
this approach was not the use of the contractor, but rather the project's total 
reliance on the contractor to perform systems analysis and design. Instead 
of augmenting systems development by providing the necessary technical 
expertise, the contractor took control of the development process. From 
LtCol. Craig's perspective, the original analysis and design performed from 
1981-83 was formulated solely with this outside expertise. The contractor 
hired programmers and analysts with civilian accounting experience who 
then applied civilian accounting principles to the development of this unique 
and complex military accounting and budgeting system. Furthermore, 
because none of the military or civil service functional representatives 
possessed systems development experience, they did not recognize the 
danger of complete contractor dependence. Documentation was the only 
byproduct of this reliance, most of which proved useless. 
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The Steering Committee finally acted on this issue in 1983 by 
reorganizing the development team. Although the Fiscal Accounting 
Division remained the System Sponsor, the Program Management Office 
now resided within the CDPA at Quantico, Virginia. It was at this point that 
LtCol. Craig became involved in SABRS development. The CDPA now 
maintained a vested interest in SABRS and the project manager had a 
source of in-house technical expertise upon which to rely. 
Mr. John, Mr. Powell, and LtCol. Craig praised the effort Col. 
Larson placed on teamwork within this new development organization. He 
also worked hard to integrate the separate cultures that are often exposed 
when military and civilian personnel work closely together. Col. Larson 
created a feeling among all development team members that SABRS was 
"their project." In fact, LtCol. Craig noted that, although four major 
contractors were used during SABRS' 14-year development life, a number 
of programmers and analysts remained on the project for the duration, 
asking to be rehired by whichever company was awarded the contract. 
3. External Organization 
There were only two noteworthy points brought out by the 
interviewees concerning the issue of external organizational relationships. 
The first, told by Col. Larson, highlights the virtual anonymity the SABRS 
project received throughout the rest of the Marine Corps. When asked if 
General Officers above those serving on the Steering Committee expressed 
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interest in the development of SABRS, Col. Larson responded by stating, 
"Are you kidding? Most General's eyes fog over at the mere mention of 
accounting or financial management systems." 
The second point was made by LtCol. Craig, and illustrates a 
positive aspect of the external relationship, as well as reinforcing previous 
comments concerning top management support. Col. Larson and LtCol. 
Craig both realized the danger posed to the project by the frequent rotation 
of key military members. Normal military tours of duty range from two to 
three·years. Extending members beyond the normal tour length is, to this 
day, considered detrimental to the military member's career. To combat this 
policy, the program manager petitioned the Steering Committee to formally 
sign letters authorizing the extension of key military members of the design 
team, such as LtCol. Craig, beyond the normal tour length. This formal 
letter, signed by two General Officers and a Senior Executive Service Grade 
Six, became a permanent record in the service member's personnel file. 
There was no doubt in either officer's opinion that these letters prevented 
tour extensions from impacting each service member's career. In fact, 
because the letters were signed by such senior leaders, the individuals may 
have actually benefited from the added attention. 
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E. DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 
The development environment elicited the strongest disagreement 
among those inteiViewed, specifically concerning the use of structured 
methodologies. 
I. Methodology Followed 
a. A Structured Methodology Was Not FoOowed During the 
''Floundering'' Era 
As promulgated in the Analysis and Design Action Plan, 
systems development was to be performed using Yourdon's structured 
systems development methodology. Mr. John, who was heavily involved in 
drafting user requirements during the early stages of development, claimed 
that no attempt was made during the "floundering'' era to enforce the usage 
of this methodology. Mr. John used as an example the March 1982 General 
Systems Design Document [Ref. 30], which laid out the overall design of 
SABRS. He noted that all design requirements were written strictly in 
prose. No evidence appeared indicating that data flow diagrams or structure 
charts were formulated consistent with the requirements of the Yourdon 
methodology. 
Mr. John expressed concern that the program manager 
lacked both the patience to learn and the will to enforce the use of the 
structured method. LtCol. Craig, on the other hand, was of the opinion that 
the contractor's control of the analysis and design stages fostered this hands-
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off approach by program management. Thus, complete trust was placed in 
the analysis and design techniques used by the contractor because, after all, 
"they were the systems development professionals." According to the LtCol., 
no Marine Corps team members during this era truly understood the 
importance that Yourdon's methodology placed on well-developed data flow 
diagrams and design structure charts. 
In contrast, Col. Larson was more critical of the analysis 
paralysis that he claimed characterized the "floundering'' era. Because the 
functional representatives were not trained to use the unique symbols 
integral to structured analysis and design, requirements were translated by 
the contractor's analysts and programmers directly from the prose. Col. 
Larson felt that this inability to communicate forced the development team 
to repeatedly re-address the same issues. He inteljected that program 
managers must adhere to milestone deadlines, with the understanding that 
it may be impossible to resolve every issue that arises in a given phase, 
especially the early phases. 
Unfortunately, the documentation produced throughout this 
period proved useless. As stated by LtCol. Craig, no analyst would have 
been able to construct a meaningful design from the paper generated during 
the first five-years. 
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b. Methodology Enforcement During the Era of Redirection and 
Progress 
Each respondent identified this period as one in which the 
new program manager, Col. Larson, enforced the use of the Yourdon 
methodology. Mr. John was most impressed with this new commitment, 
crediting the endorsement ofYourdon's method as the single most important 
reason that progress was made during this era. Mr. John was an absolute 
proponent of the structured methodology, expressing confidence that its use 
was essential to the development of SABRS. To support this assertion, he 
focused on the concurrent M3S development effort, criticizing its program 
management team for not committing to a single methodology. Mr. John 
claimed that the M3S program manager was continually influenced by every 
new methodology that promised to be the systems development "silver 
bullet." As a result, the M3S program suffered from a series of stops and 
starts, with each new method demanding that requirements be redefined. 
Mr. John also credited Col. Larson for his insistence on 
training all members of the development team in the techniques used to 
produce data flow diagrams and structure charts. A structured analysis and 
design workshop was even held at Quantico, providing two-weeks of how-to 
classes for all members of the development team, including contractor 
personnel. 
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Col. Larson himself recalled many occasions in which he and 
other members of the development team gathered to formulate and refine 
data flow diagrams and structure charts. According to LtCol. Craig, new 
team members were not allowed to deviate from the use of the structured 
methodology, regardless of their previous experience or preference. 
c. Prototyping 
Despite enforcement of the structured methodology, by 1986 
SABRS had yet to emerge from detailed design. According to Col. Larson, 
the lengthy development period, combined with increasing Congressional 
concern over costly DOD systems development, resulted in the possibility 
that SABRS could be cancelled. "Needing a victory," as Col. Larson phrased 
it, he decided to allow the use of prototyping to quickly develop a budget 
formulation subsystem. He hoped that production of this working prototype 
would forestall cancellation of the project. 
A talented Marine Sergeant began work on the prototype 
using the documentation derived over the previous three years. The tool 
used to program the budget module was FOCUS, an early fourth-generation 
language and development environment. The Sergeant coded the prototype 
without assistance and continually modified the program as defects were 
found. Within one year, the entire Fleet Marine Force was using the SABRS 
budget package to formulate annual budget submissions. Although the 
subsystem required further refinement, Col. Larson noted that the 
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prototyping effort allowed program management to confinn both the vitality 
of the SABRS concept and the quality of the user interface. 
LtCol. Craig felt that the success attributed to the prototyping 
experiment was somewhat overstated. He viewed prototyping from a purely 
"throw away" perspective, questioning whether a project as large as SABRS 
could be constructed entirely in this manner. LtCol. Craig and Mr. John 
estimated the current size of SABRS to be well over 590,000 lines of code. 
LtCol. Craig suggested that a regimented waterfall paradigm, relying on 
structured methodologies, provided the only mechanism by which such a 
large project could be managed and integrated. 
Mr. Powell, in contrast, stated the opposite opinion. He 
expressed disgust at the number of documents generated at every stage of 
SABRS development, feeling that structured methodology requirements 
created a situation whereby program management was more concerned with 
producing documents than developing the system. He referred to a 
"fascination" with the use of structured methodologies on the part of many 
members of the development team. He was a proponent, however, of 
developing prototype subsystems and felt strongly that SABRS would have 
benefited from the continuous visual refinement that this method offers. 
2. Tools 
The three program managers were not aware of any specific use 
of software engineering tools during developme- · tCol. Craig, however, 
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was quite familiar with the concept of development aids and indicated that 
the NASTEC CASE tool was used during detailed design. He further 
revealed that NASTEC was realistically only a documentation generator 
typical of the fledgling tools marketed during the 1980's and that its 
capabilities were, therefore, limited. 
The topic of programming languages elicited a more positive 
response from the four intetviewees. According to Col. Larson, COBOL was 
considered the Marine Corps' standard language for administrative 
information systems. Sometime during analysis and design, however, 
ADABASE was selected to function as the SABRS database management 
system. Use of this commercial database package negated the original need 
to scratch-build the database with COBOL. A powerful fourth-generation 
query language, known as NATURAL, emerged as a more compatible and 
efficient development environment. NATURAL proved to be much easier to 
use and learn than COBC single NATURAL command performed 
functions that would normally require many lines of COBOL code. 
Furthermore, NATURAL did not require compilation. Thus, results of 
program designs and updates could be viewed immediately. Col. Larson 
stated flatly that the Marine Corps standard requiring the use of COBOL was 
totally unrealistic in light of the specific requirements and goals of SABRS. 
He felt that relaxation of this standard was crucial to the ultimate fielding 
of SABRS, reducing both the original programming complexity and future 
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maintenance difficulties. Of the 590,000 lines of code maintained in the 
current SABRS system, Mr. John estimates that over 500,000 lines are coded 
in NA1URAL. The remaining 90,000 lines are written either in COBOL (still 
required for batch processing) or in FOCUS (the original budget formulation 
subsystem). Mr. John expects the newest release of NA1URAL to 
incorporate batch processing routines, thus allowing his maintenance 
programmers to convert the remaining 90,000 lines of code. 
F. APPUCATION CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Interaction With Other Systems 
As described previously, SABRS was developed concurrently with 
the Marine Corps Standard Supply System (M3S). LtCol. Craig specifically 
noted that both systems were designed around the ADABASE database 
management system. Common data elements were negotiated during the 
monthly M3S/SABRS development team meetings. Interface standards were 
to be developed by M3S and copied by SABRS. According to LtCol. Craig, 
until late 1987 SABRS development was performed under the assumption 
that M3S would be fielded first. 
Mr. Powell, unfortunately, experienced the effects of this 
dependence during system testing and implementation. Upon cancellation 
of M3S in the late 1980's, portions of the SABRS system were already being 
field tested at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Decisions made years earlier 
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concerning common supply/accounting identifier codes were useless. Data 
fields designed for 32-bits in the integrated system had to be reprogrammed 
to match the old supply system format. Similar interface problems 
continued to surface throughout testing and implementation. Mr. Powell 
claimed that the vast majority of these problems can be traced directly to 
SABRS' reliance on the failed M3S system. 
2. Degree of Definition 
Despite the forced integration of SABRS and M3S, all respondents 
expressed confidence that the project was well-defined at inception. They 
stated that the goal of establishing a standard financial management system 
was understood and remained the driving force throughout development. 
Mr. John, however, did reveal a specific example of "scope creep" 
that he felt slowed development. Plant property had traditionally been 
accounted for separately from financial accounting in the Marine Corps. 
According to Mr. John, someone determined during development that it 
would be "nice to have" plant property incorporated into SABRS. Mr. John 
did not feel that this addition was necessary, adding that the integration 
difficulties encountered by the developers far exceeded any potential benefit. 
3. Technological Complexity 
There was a consensus among those interviewed that the 
technological complexity of SABRS evolved during the lengthy development 
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process. Obviously, the explosion of desktop computers had its impact. 
But, the interviewees talked more about system expectations than hardware 
considerations. They noted that at the beginning of SABRS development, 
providing a "state-of-the-art" system was a driving concern. Distributed 
networks communicating with 4800 bit-per-second modems was very much 
on the leading edge of technology in the late 1970's. By the mid-1980's, 
however, those involved in SABRS development were less concerned with 
taking advantage of the wave of technological advancements, focusing 
instead on simply "getting it up and running," as Mr. Powell phrased it. So, 
as the project labored on, "good enough" was established as the 
technological benchmark. 
G. POSTSCRIPr 
Although the interviewees were not asked to comment on the ultimate 
success of SABRS' lengthy development, the author believes that, despite the 
project's many delays and difficulties, the fielding of SABRS has been a 
qualified success. If success for the SABRS project is defined as meeting its 
original 1978 goal of integrating multiple Marine Corps financial 
management systems into a single, user-controlled and highly integrated 
system, then the current version of SABRS has indeed achieved those 
objectives. The author spoke informally with a number of system users and 
maintenance programmers during the Kansas City visit, all of whom 
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expressed confidence that the system works remarkably well given its 
notorious history. Furthermore, the Kansas City staff believes strongly that 
the Department of Defense should have selected SABRS as a model for its 
planned DOD-wide financial management system. This expression of 
support from those who must maintain the system was somewhat surprising 
in light of the difficulties encountered during development. However, the 
fact that the system functions as intended convinced the author that SABRS 
must be considered a success. 
H. SUMMARY 
This chapter has focused on the ideas and opinions of four key 
members of the SABRS development team. Their comments regarding 
SABRS organization and the project team, combined with their insight into 
the development environment and application characteristics, provided an 
insider's view into SABRS development. The following chapter presents a 
series of lessons learned, derived from SABRS development, that will 
incorporate the author's personal observations and analysis. 
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VB. OBSERVATIONS AND lESSONS LEARNED 
A. INTRODUCDON 
Data obtained through the interview process communicates a number 
of themes common to SABRS development. Through the author's personal 
observations and analysis, these common themes can be translated into 
lessons learned. In some cases, even contradictory opinions convey 
important lessons, especially when confirmed through archival data. This 
chapter scrutinizes the SABRS development process by presenting key 
lessons learned. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
I. Top Management Support is Crucial to the Systems Development 
Process 
Despite the Steering Committee's initial focus on the concurrently 
developed M3S system, senior management's involvement in SABRS 
development proved crucial to its ultimate success. Without this top 
management support, especially the support provided by Mr. Comstock, 
SABRS certainly would have terminated along with M3S. 
Mr. Comstock was perhaps the only Steering Committee member 
who understood the strategic necessity of implementing an integrated 
financial management system. Rather than view SABRS as a convenient 
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add-on to M3S, as it appears other Committee members did, Mr. Comstock 
envisioned SABRS as the cornerstone of future Marine Corps financial 
management. Furthermore, he articulated that vision through personal 
involvement. His frequent visits to implementation sites illustrates his keen 
interest in the development process. These actions essentially said to each 
member of the financial management community, and to other Marine 
Corps leaders, "this project is important to the Marine Corps and it's 
important to me." 
Such strong support from the senior Marine Corps financial 
manager undoubtedly fostered project momentum, allowing SABRS to 
overcome mistakes and development team inexperience. It also permitted 
the development team a certain amount of "breathing room" in which 
organizational learning could take place. This subtle point perhaps reveals 
why top management support is so critical to bold projects such as SABRS. 
Without someone to "champion" the cause and run interference for the 
development team, each mistake and subsequent delay becomes the focus 
of criticism. Rather than learning from these mistakes, the development 
team is forced to defend the decision-making process that led to them. 
Fortunately for those involved in the SABRS project, the persistent 
determination of Mr. Comstock prevented this distraction. His involvement 
played a crucial role in allowing the systems development team to learn 
from each difficulty encountered. 
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2. The Program Manager's Leadership Abilities Matter More 1ban 
His Technical Expertise 
Advancements made during the era of redirection and progress 
can be attributed primarily to the leadership displayed by the program 
manager, Col. Larson. Unfortunately, a lack of leadership preceded this era 
and was responsible for almost five-years of wasted effort. 
The original program manager failed to exercise leadership in a 
number of instances. First, he ignored the importance of adding technical 
experts to the project team early in the development process. Second, he 
failed to request support from the Central Design and Programming Activity 
(CDPA), even though such involvement was required by the original 
Concept Statement. Third, he permitted only superficial user involvement 
through periodic and inadequate site visits. Finally, the original program 
manager displayed little interest in enforcing the use of the selected 
structured methodology by permitting the contractor to control analysis and 
design. 
Col. Larson, in contrast, displayed a thorough grasp of the need 
for the program manager to positively affect the process, rather than 
passively administer it. His leadership forged an atmosphere of cooperation 
among the military, civilian, and contractor employees. No longer was one 
group controlling development; instead, the specific expertise resident 
within each group was focused toward unified goals, The Colonel's 
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insistence on the use of the structured methodology also provides evidence 
of his effective leadership during his tenure. A standard methodology forced 
all development team members to communicate using a common format. 
Neither of these individuals possessed any prior systems 
development expertise. According to Cash and Fox [Ref. 31], a successful 
leader in program management must acquire this expertise prior to taking 
such a position. They state that a project leader must be able " ... to seek 
innovative solutions and anticipate problems before they reach the critical 
stage." They conclude by insisting that these traits ", .. are difficult to 
acquire without solid experience working With technology." 
This last assertion is not supported in the SABRS case. What 
differentiated the two project managers was their willingness to learn and 
the self-confidence to apply that knowledge, not their level of technical 
experience in systems development. Granted, Col. Larson had been exposed 
to systems development theory while earning his Master's degree, but he 
was just as inexperienced as the original project manager. Col. Larson's 
strength was that he recognized this inPxperience and used his leadership 
abilities to motivate those around him who did possess the technical 
knowledge. The original program manag~r. though perhaps acknowledging 
his own technical inexperience by allowing the contractor to control 
development, failed by not providing the direction and support necessary to 
use the technical experts effectively. 
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3. A Technical Leader Must Emerge From Within the Funding 
Organization 
As presented in the previous chapter, analysis and design 
responsibilities were placed almost entirely on the shoulders of contractor 
personnel during the "floundering'' era. Without CDPA support, program 
management was forced to entrust technical decision making to the 
contractor as well. This unfortunate situation resulted in a useless design 
that was fonnulated entirely with outside expertise. There was no one 
qualified to represent Marine Corps interests who also understood the 
technical ramifications of the contractor's analysis and design choices. 
The changes that ushered in the era of redirection and progress, 
however, thoroughly addressed this problem. Not only was the project now 
fully supported by the CDPA, but an experienced systems development 
professional was assigned to the development team. LtCol. Craig's 
emergence as the project's technical leader allowed Col. Larson to 
concentrate on the administrative and "big picture" details associated with 
program management. The importance of the technical leader's emergence 
cannot be overstated, especially in light of the previous lesson learned. If 
it is accepted that a project manager's major role is to exhibit leadership and 
that he need only possess a limited technical knowledge, then the 
emergence of a technical leader becomes crucial to the day-to-day decision 
making process. 
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This technical leader should also come from within the 
organization funding the project, especially if it is a military organization. 
The unique nature of military systems development cannot be quickly 
learned by outsourced developers. As displayed by the original SABRS 
contractor, the expectation proved faulty that a Marine Corps accounting 
system could be designed by analysts and programmers possessing 
experience only in civilian accounting systems. It demanded a professional 
from within the Marine Corps, who understood the culture of the 
organization, to oversee the translation of requirements into a meaningful 
design. 
4. Structured Methodologies Only Help Organize the Process 
Despite Col. Larson's enforcement of Yourdon's structured 
methodology, its use did not provide the breakthrough required to move 
from the paperwork design to a working system. That impetus was 
provided by the prototyping effort and the use of the NATURAL fourth-
generation language (discussed in later lessons learned). 
Arguably, Yourdon's structured methodology only helped the 
SABRS development team by stipulating procedures to more effectively 
organize the systems development process. The cookbook approach 
certainly aided SABRS developers throughout the analysis and design 
phases by providing uniform techniques for building data flow diagrams and 
structure charts. Moreover, the structured methodology produced a set of 
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coordinated documents that surpassed anything generated by the haphazard 
techniques used in earlier iterations. 
Difficulties encountered during the testing and implementation 
era, however, reveal that the application of the structured method did little 
to prevent design errors. Furthermore, the use of the structured method did 
not allow developers to test assumptions and design choices prior to formal 
coding. Fortunately, the use of NATURAL permitted programmers to 
quickly correct these errors as they were identified. Had such a language 
not been utilized, each error would have required the complete redesign of 
previously developed data flows and structure charts. There would be no 
alternative. The very nature of the structured method, with its systematic 
progression through each phase, cannot accommodate changes without 
altering the supporting paperwork. So, while the structured method may 
have helped in the establishment of consistent development procedures, it 
offered SABRS developers no direct and efficient pathway to design 
verification or system implementation. 
5. Adaptive Prototyping Can Save a Project 
The use of systems development methodologies evolved over the 
course of SABRS development. This evolution began in the "floundering'' 
era without the use of any methodology. As the project was redirected, 
strict application of Yourdon's structured method ruled the day. Then, as 
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pressure to avoid project cancellation mounted, prototyping was called upon 
to produce a working subsystem. 
The focal point of this evolution was the decision to prototype the 
Budget Formulation Subsystem. This decision was forced upon SABRS 
developers because of questions surrounding the program's lengthy 
development. Fortunately for SABRS proponents, Col. Larson possessed the 
courage to attempt prototyping. What he did not realize, however, was the 
extent to which the rest of the project relied on the adaptive use of this 
methodology. 
It is important first to note that the original Budget Formulation 
Subsystem was not constructed according to strict prototyping rules. 
Instead, the talented Sergeant continually revised his early design, never 
resorting to "throwing it away'' in favor of a more robust version. Adding 
functionality and correcting coding errors merely became part of his 
maintenance process. This built-in acceptance of change was made possible 
because the subsystem was developed in FOCUS, an early version of a 
fourth-generation language. 
Perhaps missed by LtCol. Craig in his reluctance to support 
prototyping was the realization that use of this adaptive prototyping 
methodology actually spilled over into the other subsystem efforts. The use 
of NATURAL fostered, and probably demanded, this approach. Adding 
functionality and correcting structured design flaws became an integral part 
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of the development process, just as it was throughout construction of the 
Budget Fonnulation Subsystem. 
Structured methodology proponents would argue that adding 
functionality and correcting errors so late in the process indicates a failure 
on the part of SABRS developers to accurately define requirements and 
verify design at an earlier stage. What SABRS developers learned, however, 
was that to produce a well-integrated system, requirements sometimes had 
to be defined and implemented on the fly. Structured methods cannot 
accommodate such changes in later phases. Adaptive methods thrive on 
them. 
So, in effect, SABRS owes its ultimate success to the willingness 
of the program manager to risk prototyping and the subsequent adaptation 
of prototyping to a project mired in the structured methodology. 
Unfortunately, the SABRS project had to experience the pressure of 
cancellation before risking this approach. The challenge, therefore, is to 
convince program management that such a risk is worth taking early in the 
development cycle, before pressure becomes a catalyst. 
6. Get the Right People Involved 
The importance of achieving the correct fit between people and 
tasks was evident throughout the SABRS development process. In some 
instances, appropriate individuals were assigned vital roles; in others, 
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finding the right person for a particular position was simply not a priority. 
Two examples of this latter case immediately come to mind. 
First, and perhaps most frustrating to technical members of the 
SABRS development team, was the assignment policy regarding the C4 
project officer. The skills and experience of the officers appointed never 
coincided with the responsibilities assigned. As a result, the SABRS 
development team never received external systems development guidance, 
nor were their analysis and design choices ever challenged by the intended 
verification and validation process. LtCol. Craig's comments reveal that 
external guidance and feedback were not only crucial to the development 
process, but requested by the developers. Apparently, top management was 
either unaware or unwilling to alter the established billet criteria in order to 
obtain personnel with skills more suited to this task. 
The second example of the project not matching skills to tasks was 
also visible throughout the development process. The reluctance of the 
original program manager and the inability of subsequent program 
managers to staff the SABRS development team with Limited Duty Officers 
and Warrant Officers, whose financial management systems experience was 
invaluable, severely impeded the systems development process. Not only 
would their expertise have provided a more accurate definition of 
requirements earl:' in the development cycle, but their influence and support 
might have eased the resistance to change that flared during system 
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implementation. Unfortunately, without these individuals, program 
management was forced to employ either inexperienced young officers or, 
as was often the case, use civilians with no operational Marine Corps 
financial management experience. 
In contrast to the previous examples, many SABRS development 
team members fit their tasks quite well. Obviously, Col. Larson proved to 
fit well in his role as the principal systems architect. Even the talented 
Sergeant who developed the Budget Formulation Subsystem was tasked 
with responsibilities that matched his abilities, motivation, and experience. 
Fortunately, top management was made aware of the importance of 
extending the tours of those individuals who were best suited to their task, 
such as LtCol. Craig. Although none of these individuals was a systems 
development "superstar," their consistent performances and dogged 
determination helped shape the course of SABRS development. Had the 
importance of getting the right people involved been an initial priority, 
useless document.A.tion and requirements deficiencies may not have 
characterized the first five years of SABRS development. 
7. Do Not Become Dependent on an Uncertain Resource 
The requirement to concurrently develop and fully integrate 
SABRS and M3S almost killed the SABRS program. Because M3S was in 
a perpetual state of analysis paralysis, nothing aside from documentation 
was ever produced. After nearly a decade of failures, the program was 
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finally cancelled. Since SABRS was almost totally dependent on the 
implementation of M3S, it almost suffered the identical fate. As was 
described earlier, the prototyping effort helped confirm the viability of the 
SABRS concept and its usefulness as a system separate from M3S. 
Despite this new confidence in the viability of the SABRS concept, 
the project almost buckled under the weight of the integrated design once 
testing and implementation began. The sudden shift from 32-bit fields to 
those of the old supply system, along with the need to reprogram each 
supply interface, stalled testing and implementation. Fortunately for those 
involved in SABRS development, the use of NATURAL permitted developers 
to easily (relative to COBOL) reprogram major portions of the supply system 
interface. As LtCol. Craig commented, up until its actual cancellation, 
SABRS continued as if M3S would be fielded first. This statement implies 
that there were no M3S related contingency plans built into the development 
of SABRS. Documentation reveals, however, that as early as 1981, the 
Analysis and Design Action Plan [Ref. 22, p. 8] addressed the possibility that 
SABRS could be ready prior to M3S. Unfortunately, those contingencies 
failed to account for the one event that did take place: cancellation of M3S. 
The events described above highlight the incredible increase in 
system complexity that accompanies concurrent systems development. It 
was hard enough for SABRS developers to establish their own development 
criteria without having to consider the effects of M3S integration. In effect, 
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the Marine Corps was attempting to construct two different information 
systems that both mirrored the complexity of the entire organization. The 
unbridled desire to provide greater functionality, however, forced 
management to demand that these systems be fully integrated and 
concurrently developed. But, just as Dr. Emery hypothesized in reference 
11 (see Chapter II, section E), the desired functionality exceeded the 
organization's systems development capabilities. Nonetheless, development 
pressed on, with both projects experiencing years of frustration and delays. 
8. Do Not Be Afraid to Start Over 
Arguably, the most important event that took place during SABRS 
development was the decision to completely redirect the project in 1983. It 
is most remarkable that this hierarchically driven organization, with its 
inbred stubbornness and determination, would alter its commitment to the 
chosen course of action. In this case, the SABRS course of action can be 
considered all the events that characterized the "floundering" era. 
Staw and Ross [Ref. 32] have extensively researched the 
organizational propensity to commit to failing courses of action, sometimes 
referred to as the study of escalation situations. They note that the natural 
tendency of organizations, when forced to reexamine a course of action due 
to questionable or negative outcomes, is to persist in the original course of 
action rather than withdraw. In most cases, the commitment actually 
escalates at an alarming rate. Psychological, social, and structural 
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detenninants all play a role in causing management to persist in this failing 
course of action. 
SABRS development can be considered unique because 
management did not remain committed to the original, failing course of 
action. Although their goal of creating an integrated financial management 
system remained constant, top management did not hesitate to replace the 
key decision makers responsible for the lack of progress that characterized 
the first five years of SABRS development. Senior management may be 
open to some criticism for not recognizing the need for redirection earlier, 
but the mere fact that such a courageous decision was made warrants 
praise. 
What probably fostered this organizational flexibility and resolve 
was that SABRS development was not initially identified as being vital to the 
future of the Marine Corps. Although SABRS' strategic necessity was 
understood by Mr. Comstock from its inception, he did not use that 
argument until system cancellation was threatened later in the development 
process. At the time of redirection in 1983, SABRS had not been 
"institutionalized," a tenn used by Staw and Ross in their work on escalation 
theory. Institutionalized projects rarely undergo reexamination, the authors 
conclude, because they are so closely identified with the organization. Staw 
and Ross offer Lockheed's notorious L1 011 Tri-Star civilian airliner program 
as an example. Despite a decade of enonnous losses, Lockheed persisted 
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with its major foray into commercial aviation because the corporation did 
not want to be known only as a defense contractor. SABRS, although 
obviously on a lesser scale, was fortunate not to be institutionalized in a 
similar manner. Therefore, without SABRS being integrally associated with 
the overall purpose of the Marine Corps, senior management felt free to 
alter the failing course of action in favor of a prudent alternative. 
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VJD. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUKIHER SllJDY 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis presented a broad overview of the main events surrounding 
the fourteen-year development of the Marine Corps' Standard Accounting, 
Budgeting and Reporting System (SABRS). Its goal was to derive lessons 
learned about the SABRS systems development process by means of 
qualitative research techniques that relied exclusively on archival documents 
and personal interviews. 
Following the introductory chapter, the author presented background 
infonnation relating to the systems development process. The specific 
theories presented included the two major paradigms that influenced SABRS 
development: the classic waterfall model, including the structured 
methodologies designed to navigate developers through each phase, and the 
prototyping approach. Also detailed were some major factors that are said 
to cause project delays, cost overruns, and unfulfilled requirements, such as 
the level of system complexity, the lack of user involvement in the 
development process, and the inexperience of both technical and managerial 
personnel. 
Chapter m described in considerable detail the methodology used to 
uncover specific infonnation about SABRS development. Documentation, 
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although incomplete, was located at the Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service's Kansas City Office. Further inquiry into the development process 
required that the author intetview four major players associated with the 
SABRS project, including three former program managers and the primary 
systems arctritect. 
Chapter IV provided the reader background information into 
circumstances culminating in the Marine Corps' decision to construct a 
single, integrated financial management system. The old "system" of 
financial management consisted of several highly segregated and 
incompatible systems that required considerable maintenance, wtrile 
promoting inefficiencies. The goal of SABRS was to address these issues by 
building a system that would not only integrate across financial management 
functions, but also provide the user real-time analysis and report generation 
capabilities. 
The next chapter on SABRS chronology examined the early 
development source documents obtained from the author's visit to Kansas 
City. An analysis of these documents established a confusing picture of the 
preliminary phases of SABRS development. Timelines for implementation 
presented in early documents were subsequently revised without 
explanation. 
Chapter VI closes by characterizing the three "eras" of SABRS 
development. The first, referred to as the "floundering'' era, was marked by 
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program manager disinterest and seemingly endless analysis, and lasted 
from 1978 to 1983. The second era, labeled the era of redirection and 
progress, was characterized by dynamic leadership and increased technical 
support. The third and final era lasted from 1987 until complete system 
implementation in 1992. This era was not specifically chronicled, although 
problems encountered during the testing and implementation period were 
often tied to decisions made in earlier eras. 
Chapter VII presented data obtained from each of the four interviews 
conducted. InteJViewee comments and opinions were interwoven into the 
text using an outline suggested by Dr. Lee Gremillion during a lecture given 
at the Naval Postgraduate School. Thus, each respondent's comments on 
SABRS' organizational environment, project team qualifications, 
development environment, and application characteristics were summarized 
based on this framework. 
The results obtained from each interview, combined with a thorough 
examination of the available documentation, enabled the author to generate 
eight specific lessons learned about the SABRS development process. These 
eight lessons were presented in Chapter VII and supported by the author's 
obsetvations and analysis. The key lessons learned are summarized as 
follows: 
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1. The support of top management is crucial to developing a successful 
system. 
2. The program manager must be a leader, not a technical expert. 
3. A technical leader must rise from within the funding organization to 
assist the program manager. 
4. The only benefit of structured methodologies is that they help 
organize the development process. 
5. The adaptive use of the prototyping paradigm can save an otherwise 
doomed project. 
6. The right people must be fit to the right task. 
7. A systems development project should not depend on an uncertain 
resource/concurrently developed system. 
8. An organization committed to a particular course of action must be 
willing to alter that course when questionable or negative outcomes 
arise. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUR11IER SruDY 
The author discovered early in the data gathering process of this thesis 
that it is impossible for one person to cover every issue in such a short 
period of time. There is still a great deal to be learned from the SABRS 
project. Therefore, a few personal recommendations may help focus future 
research for those interested in pursuing this topic. 
• Examine in detail the SABRS testing and implementation era. As 
alluded to previously, there were difficulties encountered during this 
phase that were attributed to earlier design decisions. How were these 
difficulties corrected? What field activities experienced the most 
resistance to SABRS implementation? The least? 
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• Compare and contrast the maintenance costs of the old 
MAGFARS/PRIME systems and SABRS. Cost savings resulting from 
the elimination of multiple systems is often predicted as part of the new 
system's economic analysis. Since SABRS has completely replaced the 
old systems, a direct comparison of these costs should be possible. 
Similarly, it might be interesting to compare the expected SABRS costs 
developed in the early 1980's with actual system costs. 
• Study the systems development of the failed Marine Corps Standard 
Supply System M3S. Because SABRS was so heavily tied to M3S 
development, yet SABRS survived while M3S was cancelled, an 
examination of that failed development might prove useful. Was M3S 
an "institutionalized" Marine Corps project?L What development 
methodologies were attempted? Was the organizational environment 
similar to SABRS, or was it significantly different? 
• Thoroughly investigate the prototyping attempt that resulted in the 
successful development of the SABRS Budget Formulation Subsystem. 
The talented Sergeant referred to in this thesis is currently a Civil 
Service employee maintaining the SABRS system at OF AS, Kansas 
City. His personal recollections, along with an evaluation of the 
FOCUS fourth-generation language, should prove enlightening and 
valuable to future developers. 
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APPENDIX A 
Factors That Influence Systerm Delivery Rate 
(Excerpted from Ref. 23--annotations are italicized) 
L ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
A. Top Management's Role 
1. Support: The degree to which top management supports and 
encourages the project can directly impact its timetable for implementation. 
Often, a senior manager becomes the project's "champion,.. extolling its 
virtues and strategic necessity to other top managers. Without such strong 
support, the project risks losing its personnel and funding priority within the 
organization. 
2. Involvement: In order for top management to be supportive 
it must also be involved in the development process. Granted, the 
development team requires a certain degree of decision making power, but 
top management must be kept abreast of the development's progress. Thus, 
when problems and delays do arise, top management will be better informed 
and maintain a vested interest in providing continued support. 
B. User/Information Systems Relationship 
On the other end of the spectrum, the user must also possess a 
vested interest in the development. The IS development team, therefore, 
should seek user input at every opportunity. Lack of user involvement will 
probably result in the end product failing to meet user needs, thus requiring 
extensive rework which is both costly and time-consuming. Similarly, user 
involvement early in the development process may alleviate the resistance 
to change encountered during system implementation. 
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D. PROJECT TEAM 
A. Individuals Assigned to the Team 
1. Ability: The talent and competence of all members of the 
development team will directly affect the project's delivery rate. Obviously, 
all programmers and analysts will not be "superstars." Given this, the 
following factors take on greater importance. 
2. Experience: Prior development experience (or lack thereof) 
of both management and technical personnel also impacts the systems 
delivery rate. Experienced dev~lopers are better able to anticipate problems 
and adjust to new ones. 
3. Motivation: The collective motivation of the development 
team is a somewhat intangible factor, yet it may overcome inexperience and 
lack of talent. Each individual's drive and professional pride determine the 
team's flexibility and resolve in the face of setbacks. 
B. How the Team is Organized 
I. InternaUy: How the project manager organizes the 
development team contributes to productivity and harmony. This is 
especially important in DOD systems development where there is a need to 
balance Military members, Civil Service employees and contractor 
personnel. A strong leader is essential to fostering teamwork amongst these 
diverse groups. 
2. Externally: Once again, there must exist a continuous 
dialogue between the user community, the development team and top 
management. The organizational structure should allow for information to 
flow smoothly among these three groups. The proper balance between 
centralized and distributed control and decision making authority is 
essential in order to maintain communication and flexibility during the 
development process. 
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JD. DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 
I. Methodology Followed: The degree to which a systems 
development methodology is followed may help or hinder the entire process. 
The development team's willingness to conform to the selected methodology 
also plays a significant role. 
2. Tools Used: Today, Computer Aided Software Engineering 
Tools (CASE) greatly improve the systems development process by 
automating many time consuming tasks. Specialized CASE software can 
translate user requirements into specific designs and, in some cases, 
generate code automatically. Despite this, CASE tools did not perform a 
significant function during the development of SABRS due to the immaturity 
of CASE technology in the early-to-mid 1980's; therefore, their use is not 
chronicled in the report. Fourth-generation languages, on the other hand, 
are also considered development tools. The use of such a tool can speed the 
development process, especially when coupled with the prototyping 
methodology. 
W. APPUCATION CHARACTERISTICS 
I. Interaction With Other Systems: Complexity of systems 
development increases dramatically when the system being developed must 
interact with several other systems. Each interface creates its own set of 
challenges and limits design flexibility. 
2. Degree of Definition: The extent to which the users and 
developers can specifically state the requirements of the system (and stick 
to them) directly impacts the speed of development. "Gold plating'' system 
requirements increases complexity, thereby stalling the entire process. 
3. Technological Complexity: The complexity of systems 
development is affected by the technological desires/requirements of the 
user. If the user wants the new system to be on the leading edge of 
technology, he or she is forcing the complexity of the system to increase 
markedly. 
4. Business Complexity: The overall complexity of the 
organization also impacts the systems development process. As mentioned 
in Chapter II, the complexity of the business is often reflected in the 
complexity of its core information system. 
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APPENDIXB 
Focusing Intemew Questions 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
1. Explain top management's role in the development of SABRS. 
Were they supportive? Was there a particular person who sticks out in your 
mind as being the "champion" of the project? 
2. Were any members of the financial community involved in the 
early analysis and design of SABRS? Were users at the field level asked to 
participate in the process? If so, were they potential users of the system, 
users of the data that the system produced, or both? 
B. PROJECf TEAM 
3. Describe the ability, experience and motivation of the members of 
the SABRS development team. In general, how did these factors contribute 
to or hinder the development process? 
4. Explain how the development team was organized internally, 
especially in light of the three communities: military, civil service and 
contractor support? . Were any problems caused by this arrangement? 
5. Describe the development team's external relationships with 
members of the Marine Corps financial community and top management. 
Was there a smooth flow of communications in each direction? 
C. DEVEIDPMENr ENVIRONMENT 
6. Was a particular systems development methodology used in the 
development of SABRS? If so, how strictly was it adhered to? Do you feel 
that use of this methodology hastened or impeded the development process? 
Explain. 
7. Were any systems development tools used during systems analysis 
and/or design? What programming language was selected? Why? 
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8. Did documentation requirements, either driven by the selected 
methodology or government directives, affect the development process? 
Explain. 
D. SABRS APPUCATION CHARACTERISTICS 
9. Was SABRS designed to "stand alone" or interact with other 
information systems? If designed to inte~.ct. was such integration planned 
originally, or did it creep in during analysis and/or design? 
10. Was the goal of the SABRS system well-defined initially or did 
"scope creep"/'gold plating'' occur? Explain 
11. Was the goal of the system to provide state-of-the-art technological 
capability or did "good enough" suffice? 
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